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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §§ 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46B-16, Utah Code 
Ann, 1953, as amended. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. The preliminary issue to be decided by this Court is, 
did the Industrial Commission err in not finding Mark Bundy d/b/a 
Mark Bundy Trucking (hereinafter "Bundy"), the common law 
uninsured employer, and/or the Uninsured Employer's Fund jointly 
liable with BB & B Transportation (hereinafter "BB & B"), the 
statutory employer, for a portion of the death benefits awarded 
the deceased's minor heirs as is required by §35-1-107, Utah Code 
Ann., as amended in 1988? (Appendix 1 hereto) 
B. Did the Industrial Commission properly determine that BB 
& B was the only employer of the deceased? Sub-issues to that 
issue include: 1) Were Bundy and BB & B in a joint venture 
sharing control responsibilities making Phillipsen a joint 
employee, and 2) Did the Industrial Commission properly apply and 
interpret the "lent employee doctrine" when it found BB & B was 
the "only employer" of the deceased when the doctrine itself 
states that when the conditions for a finding of "lent employee" 
are present, it necessarily follows that both the "special 
employer" and the "actual employer" are liable for workmen's 
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compensation? Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1993, §48, 
Lent Employees and Dual Employment, p. 8-434. 
C. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by 
looking beyond the stipulation of the parties that BB & B was a 
"statutory employer" of the deceased to find a different 
relationship in an effort to protect the Employer's Reinsurance 
Fund it administers from contributing to the workers compensation 
obligation of an insolvent employer? §35-1-107 U.C.A., as 
amended in 1988. 
D. Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by 
basing its order on legal theories not raised by the parties 
without giving those adversely affected an opportunity to brief 
and argue the issues? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is a correction of error standard 
without deference to the decision of the administrative agency 
when "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) & 
(h)(iv) Utah Code Ann.; Morton International, Inc., v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
App. 1991). The above is the standard on each of the issues 
before the Court. 
2 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT 
THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Industrial Commission of Utah awarded death benefits to 
the minor heirs of Robert T. Phillipsen who was killed while 
driving a truck in the course of his employment. (See Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, R. 224-235 attached as 
Appendix 2 hereto; and Order Granting Motion for Review, R. 224-
275-281 attached as Appendix 3 hereto,) The parties on appeal do 
not contest the award of benefits. Rather the parties contest 
which of them is responsible for those payments and in what 
proportion they are responsible. The minor heirs are not parties 
to the appeal. While the issues among the parties are being 
determined the petitioner, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
(hereinafter "WCF"), the workers compensation insurance carrier 
for BB & B, is advancing payment of compensation benefits. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was fatally 
injured May 10, 1991, while driving a truck owned by respondent 
Bundy and leased to petitioner BB & B. The minor heirs of Robert 
T. Phillipsen filed a claim for death benefits on August 3, 1992. 
(R. 4) Though filed beyond the statutory one year limitation 
period (§35-1-98 U.C.A.), the administrative law judge found the 
tolling provisions of § 78-12-36 U.C.A. to be applicable. (R. 
47) No party contests that decision. 
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An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 22, 1993. (R. 
100, R. 357-432) At the hearing counsel for BB & B and WCF 
stipulated that for the purposes of the application for death 
benefits, BB & B was a statutory employer of deceased. The 
administrative law judge and the other parties acceded to the 
stipulation. (R. 359-360) The administrative law judge entered 
his Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order on May 6, 1993. 
(Appendix 2 hereto.) Applying the facts to the law, the 
administrative law judge found essentially the following: 
1. The deceased was an employee of respondent Bundy 
and a statutory employee of petitioner BB & B; 
2. Respondent Bundy is an employer jointly responsible 
with petitioner WCF for the payment of death benefits to the 
minor heirs. 
3. The WCF is to pay the benefits in the first 
instance subject to being reimbursed 50% from Bundy. 
4. In the event Bundy is insolvent or unable to pay 
the liability assessed, pursuant to § 35-1-107, Utah Code Ann., 
Uninsured Employer's Fund (hereinafter "UEF") will be responsible 
to pay Bundy's 50%. 
UEF filed a Motion for Review on June 1, 1993, arguing the 
following: 
1. The issue is one of statutory construction of §35-
1-107 U.C.A.; 
2. The statutory employer (BB & B) should be 
responsible for 100% of the death benefits because in UEF's 
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interpretation of §35-1-107 U.C.A., the role of the UEF is as a 
fund of last resort or "safety net" in the event all employers 
and statutory employers are uninsured and insolvent. 
(R. 269-274) 
Bundy filed his Motion for Review on June 7, 1993, arguing 
primarily the application of the facts to the law as follows: 
1. The deceased, Phillipsen, was an independent 
contractor of Bundy, not in an employee/employer relationship 
with Bundy, and therefore Bundy should have no liability to pay 
workers' compensation benefits to the Phillipsen minor heirs; 
2. BB & B was Phillipsen's sole employer and therefore 
responsible for all of the statutory benefits. 
(R. 237-263) 
BB & B and WCF filed a responsive memorandum supporting the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the 
administrative law judge on June 22, 1993. (R. 264-268) WCF had 
earlier raised the issue of Bundy's joint responsibility for 
compensation payments in its argument at the hearing. (R. 419-
422) 
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order Granting Motion 
for Review on March 22, 1994, ruling in essential part as 
follows: 
1. The Commission adopted the administrative law 
judge's Findings of Fact but made different conclusions of law 
based on those facts; 
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2. Though not raised by any of the parties, the 
Commission concluded Bundy was a "lent employee" and BB & B was 
his "special employer"; 
3. The deceased as a "lent employee" was solely in 
the service of BB & B at the time of the fatal accident; and 
4. Bundy and UEF are not liable for any portion of the 
benefits. 
(R. 275-281 and Appendix 3) 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Industrial Commission of Utah adopted as its own the 
Findings of Fact of the administrative law judge. (R. 275) The 
sole exception to that was the Commission finding that 
"Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of his 
fatal industrial accident." (R. 275) BB & B and WCF do not 
dispute that finding. The findings of the administrative law 
judge adopted by the Commission conclusively demonstrate that 
Phillipsen was also performing the work of Bundy at the time of 
his accident. Bundy's work included the supplying of trucks and 
drivers over whom he maintained joint elements of control with 
the statutory employer BB & B. Counsel for BB & B and WCF 
stipulated at the hearing that BB & B had the right and had 
exercised sufficient control over the operations performed by 
Phillipsen to be found a "statutory employer". All parties 
acceded to that stipulation (R. 359-360). The issue at hearing 
then became whether Bundy was also an employer of Phillipsen at 
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the time of his death. The facts outlined below are undisputed 
and either those adopted by the Commission in support thereof. 
At the time of the fatal accident Phillipsen was driving a 
tractor/trailer unit owned by Bundy (R. 351, 3 69), who operated 
as a "sole proprietorship" (R. 368-369). Bundy leased his 
equipment and driver to BB & B (R. 369) pursuant to a "Lease 
Agreement". (Ex. D-l, R. 329-340, 370, Appendix 4 hereto). The 
accident vehicle had placards on it with logos for both Mark 
Bundy Trucking and BB & B. (R. 388) Bundy drove one of the 
leased rigs himself. (R. 379) Phillipsen was hired by Bundy and 
signed a document prepared by Bundy entitled "Independent 
Contractor Agreement". (Ex. D-3, R. 354-356, 374-375, Appendix 5 
hereto). 
The Lease Agreement provided among other things: 
3. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LESSEE. Lessor 
TBundyl shall furnish a driver or drivers for 
each unit of the Leased Equipment. Lessee 
[BB & B] Shall have the complete care, 
custody and control of both the Leased 
Equipment and drivers furnished therewith, 
provided however that Lessor fBundy] shall 
have full and exclusive responsibility for; 
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours 
and working conditions of and adjusting the 
grievances of, supervising, training, 
disciplining, and firing of all drivers, ... 
which driver... shall be, either the employees 
of the lessor or under the direct economic 
control of the Lessor; 
(B) paying all operating and related 
expenses for the Leased Equipment, including 
all expenses of fuel, oil and repairs to the 
Leased Equipment, road taxes, mileage taxes, 
fines for parking, moving or overweight 
violations, licenses, permits or any other 
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levies or assessments based upon the 
operation of Leased Equipment... 
(Emphasis added.) Bundy acknowledged that he had the power to 
hire and fire Phillipsen (R. 379-380) and in fact was required to 
do the hiring and handle all matters dealing with the drivers. 
(R. 388) 
The Lease Agreement also provided for Bundy to procure and 
pay for liability and cargo insurance (R. 333) , to be totally 
responsible for loss or damage to the Leased Equipment (R. 336) 
and except for a few specific exceptions to be "..responsible for 
and ...pay the cost of all fuels, lubricating oils, repairs, fuel 
taxes, empty mileage permits or all kinds and types...tolls, 
ferries, base plates and other vehicle licenses." (R. 337) 
Bundy in fact performed and paid for those services. (R. 378, 
380) 
In exchange for the above retained responsibilities and the 
use of truck and driver, BB & B paid Bundy 85% of the gross 
receipts keeping 15% for itself. (R. 340) It was up to Bundy to 
set the wage of his drivers. Bundy agreed to pay Phillipsen 
twenty percent of the amount left after BB & B's 15% cut. (R. 
354-355, 366, 377, 380, 389, Exhibit D-3, Appendix 5 hereto). BB 
& B never paid Phillipsen anything. The checks were all paid by 
Bundy. (R. 381) As can be seen both the income for Bundy and 
for BB & B was not a set figure. The amount depended on the 
gross receipts from the joint efforts of BB & B and Bundy to 
deliver goods to specific destinations. 
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Bundy drafted what he titled "Independent Contractor 
Agreement" which is signed by him and Phillipsen. (R. 354-355, 
Ex. D-3, Appendix 5 hereto) The terms of that agreement were 
obviously an effort by Bundy to avoid the legal responsibilities 
an employer has for its employees. Notwithstanding that effort, 
the administrative law judge correctly found: 
...[A]lthough the parties recited in their 
lease that they had an independent contractor 
relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, 
had no real choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 
2 0% of the revenue generated for the load 
that he took, and there was no evidence 
offered to indicate that he had any 
negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever 
with respect to that term of the agreement. 
Further, the truck Mr. Phillipsen was driving 
was owned by Mark Bundy. There was no 
provision in the contract whereby Mr. 
Phillipsen could refuse to haul a load or an 
oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr. 
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on 
the truck that Mr. Phillipsen was driving, so 
that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a 
certain speed limit. With respect to the 
relationship between Mr. Bundy and Mr. 
Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power 
of control over the decedent. Although the 
Independent Contractor Agreement did not 
retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that 
power in a separate lease agreement he 
executed in 1990, with BB & B Transportation. 
In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a 
driver and was to "have full and exclusive 
responsibility for...hiring, setting the 
wages, hours and working conditions of and 
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, 
training, disciplining and firing of all 
drivers..."... 
***** 
...I find and conclude that Robert T. 
Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy 
Trucking on May 10, 1991, when he sustained 
his fatal compensable industrial accident. 
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(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Appendix 2 
hereto at pages 5 and 6; R. 228-229) 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In 1984, the Utah Legislature enacted §35-1-107 U.C.A. which 
established the Uninsured Employer's Fund. The purpose of the 
Uninsured Employer's Fund was originally limited to being the 
last resort payer of compensation benefits to injured employees 
whose employers had failed to buy workmen's compensation 
insurance and were otherwise financially incapable of paying the 
benefits. Funds for the UEF are provided through a premium tax 
paid by the State's insurance carriers which write workmen's 
compensation insurance. The UEF is administered by the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
An argument was made in 1987 in the case of Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, infra., that the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund should either share or pay all of the benefits in situations 
when the actual employer is uninsured and there is a "statutory 
employer". The Court of Appeals ruled UEF was not liable for 
payments because the statute provided that its responsibility 
began only "...when every employer of the claimant..." including 
statutory employers were uninsured and insolvent. 
Because of the perceived unfairness to innocent "statutory 
employers", joint employers and their insurance carriers having 
to pay for uninsured employers' failures, the Legislature took 
little time in reacting to the Jacobsen case. In 1988, §35-1-107 
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was amended eliminating the word "every" on which the Court had 
relied in Jacobsen. The Legislature also added the phrase that 
the UEF is to "...assist in the payment...if the person's 
employer is individually, jointly, or severally liable..." UEF 
is therefore obligated to share the responsibility. That 
accomplishes the beneficent intent of the Legislature to spread 
among all insurance carriers the costs of protecting the State's 
workmen from unscrupulous or negligent employers' failures to 
provide coverage. 
Herein, the Industrial Commission overruled the 
administrative law judge's well thought out opinion which found 
UEF partially responsible to pay benefits. To do so the 
Commission incorrectly ignored a stipulation that BB & B was a 
statutory employer. Then the Commission injected a theory not 
raised by any party. The Commission made no procedural 
provisions for any of the parties to address the new theory. It 
misapplied the uncontroverted facts to the "Lent Employee 
Doctrine". The Commission decided BB & B was the only employer 
and therefor solely liable. However, the Commission failed to 
recognize that once the elements of the "Lent Employee Doctrine" 
have been established for both employers, "...both employers are 
liable for workmen's compensation." Larson, infra. 
The undisputed facts support the conclusion that BB & B and 
Bundy each had the right to and in fact exercised control over 
Phillipsen. They were engaged in a joint enterprise of 
delivering freight to customers. Bundy supplied the trucks, 
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maintained the equipment, hired the drivers, set the 
compensation, paid the drivers and handled all personnel matters. 
In return BB & B took care of the business aspects of the 
operation including, customer relations and negotiations, truck 
routing and dispatching, billing of customers, collection of 
revenue etc. The gross receipts were shared with Bundy taking 
85% and BB & B 15%. 
In circumstances such as that, the case authority supports 
but one result. Bundy and BB & B shared the employer 
relationship. Phillipsen was the direct employee of Bundy and a 
statutory employee of BB & B. Therefore, Bundy does have an 
obligation to pay a portion of the benefits. At a minimum, Bundy 
and BB & B are joint and equal employers. Because Bundy is 
uninsured and apparently impecunious, the responsibility is on 
UEF to "assist in the payment" of the benefits to the Phillipsen 
heirs. The administrative law judge's determination that the UEF 
share with the Workers Compensation Fund equally in the payment 
of benefits in the event Bundy is unable to pay should be reinstated. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS7 FUND HAS AN 
OBLIGATION TO PAY A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS WHEN THE INJURED OR DECEASED 
EMPLOYEE HAS JOINT EMPLOYERS AND ONE OR MORE OF THOSE 
EMPLOYERS IS UNABLE TO "COVER [ITS] WORKERS 
COMPENSATION LIABILITIES".1 
As will be argued in following points, Bundy and BB & B were 
either in an employer/statutory employer relationship or were 
joint employers of Phillipsen. The Court should determine this 
issue first. If the Court decides there are no circumstances 
under which UEF could be responsible to pay a share of 
compensation benefits in dual employment circumstances, then 
there is no real reason to determine the other issues. As a sole 
proprietor entrepreneur without insurance, Bundy apparently has 
no assets from which to pay the death benefits to the Phillipsen 
heirs. 
This is not the first time this issue has been presented to 
the Court of Appeals. In Jacobsen v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
738 P.2d 658 (Utah App. 1987) the Court was asked to consider 
whether the statutory employer and UEF should share in the 
payment of benefits when the actual employer was uninsured and 
unable to do so. At that time §35-1-107(1), 1986 stated UEF: 
...has the purpose of paying and assuring, to 
persons entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits when every employer of the claimant 
who is found to be individually, jointly, or 
severally liable...does not have sufficient 
*. §35-1-107(1) U.C.A., 1990. See the entire current version of the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund enabling statute as Appendix 1 hereto. 
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funds, insurance, sureties, or other security 
to cover workers' compensation liabilities 
under this chapter. 
(Emphasis added.) The Court emphasized that the word "every" was 
the controlling feature of the statute. The reasoning of the 
Court was essentially that as long as any entity or individual in 
a workers' compensation employer relationship with the injured 
employee is capable of paying the benefits, UEF has no 
responsibility. 
In what one might conclude to be a direct response to the 
Jacobsen decision, the Legislature amended §35-1-107(1) in 1988 
by eliminating the word "every" upon which the Jacobsen Court 
relied. At the time of the accident in question and currently 
the statute reads in pertinent part: 
...The fund has the purpose of assisting in 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
to any person entitled to them, if that 
person's employer is individually. iointly, 
or severally liable to pay the benefits, but 
...does not have sufficient funds...to cover 
workers' compensation liabilities... 
(Emphasis added.) (See Appendix 1 for the complete text.) This 
Court must consider that the Legislature made the above changes 
advisedly. The term "assisting in the payment" can only 
contemplate that UEF has the obligation to "assist" some other 
person or entity making compensation benefits. The elimination 
of the word "every" makes it clear that UEF must assist those in 
any sort of workers' compensation employer relationship even if 
they are capable of paying the benefits because of having 
insurance coverage or qualifying as self-insureds. 
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The good sense of this sort of cost spreading is borne out 
when one considers how UEF is financed. Every workers 
compensation insurance carrier in the State, including WCF, pays 
a premium tax assessed by the Industrial Commission of Utah. A 
portion of the dollars so generated is dedicated to funding UEF. 
§59-9-102(2)(a) & (b) U.C.A. Therefore, in reality, this is a 
method for insurance carriers and employers to spread the risk of 
being found secondarily or jointly responsible for paying 
compensation benefits to cover employers who fail to comply with 
the statutory requirement to provide for their employees. In 
other words, it prevents an unfair burden on one employer or 
insurance carrier in joint responsibility situations. 
The Industrial Commission overruled the administrative law 
judge who opined on that issue: 
The Uninsured Employer's Fund takes the 
position that it is only secondarily 
liable...and that [UEF] only has liability in 
the eVent that the statutory employer and the 
uninsured employer are unable to pay 
benefits...The Legislature in the 1988 
amendment specifically removed the word every 
from that statute. I can only conclude that 
the intent of the Legislature in removing the 
word every was to overcome the effects of the 
decision in Jacobsen v. Industrial 
Commission... 
...To adopt the position [UEF] which was 
urged at hearing, would mean that the 
Administrative Law Judge by administrative 
fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 
amendment to §35-1-107... 
(R. 231, Appendix 2 at page 8) The Commission did not rule on 
that issue. Instead, in a misguided attempt to protect the Fund 
it is charged by statute to administer [§35-1-107(2)], it formed 
15 
an unsupported legal conclusion based on the undisputed facts 
that BB & B was the only employer of Phillipsen. This Court 
should not succumb to that guise and fail to rule on this most 
important issue. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO RECOGNIZE 
THE ONLY REASONABLE LEGAL CONCLUSION ONE CAN DRAW FROM 
THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS THAT BB & B AND BUNDY EACH 
OCCUPIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH PHILLIPSEN THAT IMPOSES 
THE DUTY TO PAY THE PHILLIPSEN HEIRS WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS. 
As the Court was previously advised, all parties and the 
administrative law judge accepted the stipulation by WCF and BB & 
B that it was the statutory employer of Phillipsen. The 
administrative law judge went on to correctly analyze the 
standard that establishes without question that both Bundy and BB 
& B occupy a relationship with Phillipsen with sufficient indices 
of control to require each to pay workers's compensation benefits 
incurred as a result of his death. The judge explained2: 
This issue of the effect of an independent 
contractor agreement executed by a driver has 
been previously addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons 
v. Ashton, [538] P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). In 
the Ashton case, the Court addressed the 
legal effect of an "Independent Contractor 
Agreement" similar to that executed by Bundy 
and the decedent in this matter. There the 
Court indicated: 
It should be had in mind that the issue 
is not whether Dennis A. Ashton was an 
employee of Young in the dictionary 
sense, nor is it to be determined solely 
from the terms used. Particularly, its 
Because the judge recited the standard so clearly, petitioners will 
quote extensively from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 
pages 4 and 5. The entire text of his decision is found in Appendix 2 hereto. 
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character is not necessarily fixed by 
the fact that the agreement recites that 
it is not an employer - employee 
relationship, but is that of an 
independent contractor. The question of 
entitlement to workman's compensation 
depends on whether the facts and 
circumstances bring him within the 
requirements of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act... 
***** 
To provide guidance in this area, the 
Court set forth the following parameters: 
The main facts to be considered as 
bearing on the relationship here 
are: (1) Whatever covenants or 
agreements exist concerning the 
right of direction and control over 
the employee, whether express or 
implied; (2) The right to hire and 
fire; (3) The method of payment, 
i.e., whether in wages or fees, as 
compared to payment for a complete 
job or project; and (4) The 
furnishing of equipment. 
The administrative law judge in reviewing the relationship 
between Bundy and Phillipsen quite appropriately found that under 
any interpretation of the facts of this case, Bundy was 
Phillipsen's employer. (See Appendix 2 at page 6 of Order). 
Bundy was required to maintain control over the leased driver by 
virtue of his agreement with BB & B. He had the right to hire 
and fire. He dictated the wages for and paid Phillipsen and was 
in charge of all personnel responsibilities involving Phillipsen. 
He also furnished and maintained all of the equipment. 
The indices of BB & B's control of Phillipsen were different 
in some respects. Nonetheless, BB & B had a limited right to 
fire Bundy drivers. BB & B dispatched the drivers, assigned them 
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the loads to haul and expected drivers to prepare all of the 
paper work necessary for completion of the work. Using the 
criteria of the Ashton, supra, decision, there can be no doubt 
that there are enough indices for the finding that BB & B also 
stood in a position of a statutory employer of Phillipsen. 
Therefore, the facts are undisputed, the law is clear that 
Bundy and BB & B each had a relationship with Phillipsen that had 
the earmarks of retained right of control. Each had an 
individual responsibility for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits. With no factual support and no 
substantive legal analysis in its Order Granting Motion for 
Review, the Commission has attempted to apply the legal theory of 
"lent employee" to make BB & B the sole responsible employer. 
Before examining the Commission's misanalysis of that theory, we 
will examine the relationship between BB & B and Bundy. 
C. BUNDY AND BB & B WERE UNITED FOR A COMMON 
PURPOSE FOR MUTUAL PROFIT AND THEREFORE PARTNERS IN A 
JOINT ENTERPRISE MAKING THEM COEMPLOYERS OF PHILLIPSEN 
WHO WAS PERFORMING THEIR JOINT WORK AT THE TIME OF THE 
FATAL ACCIDENT. 
The facts as outlined previously leave no doubt that 
Phillipsen was answerable to both Bundy and BB & B for his 
conduct as a driver of the Bundy equipment. The relationship 
between Bundy and BB & B is memorialized in the Lease Agreement. 
Bundy was a sole proprietorship entering into a joint business 
venture with BB & B for mutual gain. Each had certain assets to 
contribute in order to produce the revenue. Bundy was to supply 
and maintain the equipment, hire and handle personnel matters 
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with the drivers, set drivers' wages and supply the expertise in 
hauling freight. BB & B was to handle the negotiations and 
contracts with the customers, organize delivery schedules, 
dispatch the drivers, do the accounting, send the customer 
billings and collect the proceeds. The mutual goal was to 
efficiently deliver freight by truck for a profit. Bundy was not 
paid a fixed amount for his responsibilities. Neither was BB & B 
to be paid a fixed amount for its responsibilities. Instead, 
Bundy was to receive 85% of the proceeds and BB & B was to 
receive 15% of the proceeds. 
The administrative law judge recognized the above 
relationship in citing to Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 
P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). (Appendix 6 hereto) Therein, the Supreme 
Court was faced with a similar situation. Kinne entered into a 
contract with Freeport Center to supply a truck and driver for 
hauling freight. While driving pursuant to that arrangement, a 
driver hired by Kinne was killed in a collision with a train. 
The Industrial Commission held that the driver was an employee of 
Kinne and that Kinne was jointly and severally liable for the 
compensation award with Freeport Center which was a "statutory 
employer." Kinne appealed that order. The Court sustained the 
Commissions order explaining: 
...Kinne is not relieved of his obligation by 
the fact that another employer, Freeport 
Transport, Inc., was a statutory employer 
also responsible for workmen's compensation 
coverage. An employee, for the purpose of 
workmen's compensation, may have two 
employers. See Blessing v. T. Shriver & Co., 
94 N.J.Super. 426, 228 A.2d 711 (1967). 
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609 P.2d at 928.3 (Emphasis added). 
The relationships established in the case at bar and in the 
Kinne case are analogous to the joint enterprise analysis of this 
Court in Aracron v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P. 2d 250 (Utah App. 
1993) . Though the issue being determined was different, the 
philosophy is instructive: 
The material question in this case is whether 
Borden and Clover Club together constitute an 
employing unit analogous to the employing 
units created between joint venturers. In 
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2. 20, 
386 P.2d 616 (1963), two companies entered 
into a joint venture to construct a tunnel. 
Because they were united for a common 
purpose, and because whatever one did would 
inure to the benefit of the other, both 
companies were treated as one "employing 
unit," and the employees of both companies 
were treated as being "engaged in the same 
employment." 
386 P. 2d at 255. Likewise, here Bundy and BB & B were "united 
for a common purpose" and for purposes of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act they are "one employing unit" each having a 
The administrative law judge's opinion is not without precedent in 
other jurisdictions. See for example the following taken from footnotes in 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Infra.: Indiana—Long v. Sims Motor 
Transp. Lines, 124 Ind. App. 504, 117 N.E.2d 276 (1954). Lessor of truck 
under a "trip lease", who retained right to fire and the duty of upkeep of 
truck, was liable for compensation, since the arrangement constituted a dual 
employment. Motor Dispatch Inc. v. Snodqrass, 301 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1973). The industrial board found that the truck owner and lessee of the 
truck which the decedent was driving were coemployers and compensation was 
awarded against both. The lessee appealed. The appellate court upheld the 
board's order. The test of employer status is: "who has the power to control 
and direct the servant in the performance of the particular work." The 
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a mixed control, not necessarily 
complete in either. 
Louisiana—Maryland Cas. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Is. Co., 194 So.2d 204 (La. Ct. 
App. 1967). Claimant was employed by Baton Rouge, who leased equipment and 
operators to others. Claimant was injured while working on a job for Joy. 
Held: The general employer and the special employer were each liable for one-
half of the compensation award. 
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responsibility for paying workers compensation benefits. The 
difference here is that BB & B is willing to accept its 
responsibility and Bundy is not. BB & B is willing to accept its 
responsibility and UEF is not. 
Professor Arthur Larson's Treatise on Workmen's Compensation 
Law discusses the relationship the facts present in this case: 
Joint employment occurs when a single 
employee, under contract with two employers, 
and under the simultaneous control of both, 
simultaneously performs services for both 
employers, and when the service for each 
employer is the same as, or is closely 
related to, that for the other. In such a 
case, Jboth employers are liable for workmen's 
compensation. 
***** 
Joint employment is possible, and indeed 
fairly common, because there is nothing 
unusual about the coinciding of both control 
by two employers and the advancement of the 
interests of two employers in a single piece 
of work. It has already been noted that, in 
the familiar situation of the leased truck 
and driver...the lessor may be accomplishing 
his business purpose of furnishing equipment 
and labor at a profit, while the lessee is at 
the same moment accomplishing his business 
purpose of transporting goods...and the 
lessor may retain enough control to safeguard 
his interest the valuable equipment, while 
the lessee may assume enough control to get 
his work done efficiently. 
Arthur Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1993, Vol. 
IB, pp. (Emphasis added.) 
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D. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED AND 
MISAPPLIED THE "LENT EMPLOYEE" DOCTRINE. BOTH BUNDY 
AND BB & B MEET THE LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 
CRITERIA WHICH REQUIRES THAT BOTH EMPLOYERS BE LIABLE 
FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. 
The Commission inappropriately concluded "..the decedent was 
a loaned employee solely in the service of BB & B at the time of 
the fatal industrial accident." (Appendix 3 at page 4, R.278) 
As argued above, the Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission 
do not support such a conclusion. Even if Phillipsen was, 
arguendo, a lent employee, he was most definitely not solely in 
the service of BB & B. Being a lent employee does not exclude a 
joint responsibility to pay compensation benefits. 
§48.00 When a general employer lends an 
employee to a special employer; the special 
employer becomes liable for workmen's 
compensation only if: 
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, 
express or implied with the special employer; 
(b) the work being done is essentially that 
of the special employer; and 
(c) the special employer has the right to 
control the details of the work. 
When all three of the above conditions are 
satisfied in relation to both employers, both 
employers are liable for workmen's 
compensation. 
Larson's, supra. §48, Vol. IB, p. 8-434. (Emphasis added). 
Being a lent employee is only the first question to examine in 
determining whether the obligation for compensation benefit 
payments are to be shared. As argued hereinbefore, the 
uncontroverted facts are that BB & B and Bundy both meet the (a), 
(b), (c) criteria of the "Lent Employee Doctrine". Phillipsen 
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was hired by Bundy subject to the right of BB & B to verify his 
skills as a driver. Either could fire Phillipsen. The work 
being done was the joint work of the two employers. They split 
the gross receipts received from the operation of the trucks on a 
percentage basis with Bundy getting the far greater share. They 
each retained by deed and contract the right to control 
Phillipsen's work activities. In that circumstance Larson and 
the cases cited in earlier arguments dictate a shared 
responsibility for workmen's compensation benefits. 
E. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE A STIPULATION BY THE 
PARTIES ACCEPTED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE THAT 
BB & B WAS THE "STATUTORY EMPLOYER" OF PHILLIPSEN AND 
THEN INTRODUCING THE "LENT EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE" AS BASIS 
FOR ITS DECISION WHEN IT WAS NEVER RAISED NOR ARGUED BY 
THE PARTIES WITHOUT GIVING THE PARTIES AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO PRESENT ARGUMENT. 
Petitioners will not present lengthy argument regarding this 
point. However, it is important that this Court alert the 
Industrial Commission that it has an obligation to provide a fair 
forum for the litigants to address the issues before it. When in 
the course of proceedings all parties are represented by 
competent counsel, a stipulation consistent with the basic 
purposes of fair compensation to injured workmen should be 
honored. That is especially true when the stipulation entered by 
the parties actually insures that the dependent minor heirs of 
Mr. Phillipsen will receive the compensation to which they are 
entitled. The stipulation by WCF that BB & B was a "statutory 
employer11 was the correct approach to take in this case. It 
insured that the minor children of Mr. Phillipsen would 
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immediately receive compensation. They were not caused to wait 
for the benefits while the employers contested the issue of who 
was responsible and for how much. Those funds are being paid 
while this appeal proceeds. 
Furthermore, it is improper for the Commission to introduce 
a completely new theory not raised by any party at the motion for 
review stage of the proceedings. The theory simply should be 
considered waived if the parties have not raised it. In the 
event it is raised, the parties both for whom the new theory is 
helpful as applied and those adversely affected should be given 
the opportunity to present arguments. That right was not 
afforded in this case. 
The Commission should be alerted to the fact that when it 
acts in that fashion, the general impression is that it leaves 
its role as an impartial adjudicator and becomes an advocate. In 
this instance it becomes an advocate for the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund which it is charged by statute to administer. Based on long 
experience with the Commission, petitioners herein know the 
Commission truly tries to be fair and impartial. However, this 
Court's admonition to the Commission to avoid the appearance of 
advocacy for a party will be appreciated. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah has as one of its 
purposes to have industry pay the costs of unfortunate accidents 
which befall its employees. The Act does that by spreading the 
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liability among all employers by requiring them to obtain 
workmen's compensation insurance. (The sole exception to that is 
for the very largest employers who meet the Commission's criteria 
to qualify as self-insureds.) That makes it possible for the 
small employers such as Bundy and medium sized employers such as 
BB & B to continue in business even when the unfortunate 
catastrophic accident occurs. The Legislature recognized that in 
some circumstances employers will not obey the law to procure 
insurance. In such an instance, prior to the passage of §35-1-
107 U.C.A., the injured employee was left without benefits. 
§35-1-107 U.C.A. established the Uninsured Employer's Fund 
to pay those benefits. Financing for the Uninsured Employer's 
Fund is obtained by means of a premium tax assessed to all 
insurance carriers which write such compensation policies. That 
places the burden for defaulting employers back on industry where 
it belongs. 
After a few years of experience with that system, the 
Legislature recognized that "statutory employers," joint 
employers and/or their insurance carriers could be hit with a 
significant liability in the event common law and/or coemployers 
fail to obtain compensation insurance. A catastrophic accident 
could significantly impact the business viability of such 
entities. Therefore, in 1988, the Legislature amended §35-1-107 
U.C.A. to make it clear that UEF should share that 
responsibility. The effect is again to place more of the risk on 
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industry as a whole and not focus it on an innocent statutory 
employer which had complied with the law. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah fails to recognize the 
Legislature's intent. Instead, the Commission has misapplied the 
"lent employee" doctrine to reverse the correct ruling entered by 
the administrative law judge. The evidence in this case leads to 
the Conclusions of Law entered by the administrative law judge. 
Bundy and BB & B have a joint liability to the Phillipsen heirs. 
Because Bundy is uninsured and incapable of paying his share, the 
Uninsured Employer's Fund should fulfill its purpose and pay 
Bundy's share. This Court should reverse the decision of the 
Industrial Commission and remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission to reinstate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of the administrative law judge. 
DATED this ;2^ j day of August, 1994. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH ss 
Co/Counsel for BB & B 
Transportation and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
By: 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Co-Counsel for BB & B 
Transportation and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
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APPENDIX 1 
SECTION 35-1-107, U.C.A., AMENDED 1988 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-107 
History: R.S. 1933, 42-l-97a, enacted by 
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-l-97a. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 92 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 64(2). 
35-1-107. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund has the pur-
pose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or 
has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insur-
ance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities. 
This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity 
Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obliga-
tions of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the 
exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Sub-
section 59-9-101 (2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall 
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon the 
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county at-
torney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under this 
title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation of the fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to 
or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer 
failing to make the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent 
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court 
with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority 
equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of 
this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the 
fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's 
expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liq-
uidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the cov-
ered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the 
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the assets 
of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as 
allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
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(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of 
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its 
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management 
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon render-
ing a decision with respect to any claim for workers' compensation benefits, 
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of 
the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the addi-
tional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be 
docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state trea-
surer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, 
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets 
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of 
any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured 
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subse-
quent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subse-
quent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and 
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each self-
insured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the 
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual 
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each 
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an 
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for 
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in 
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the 
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion 
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are 
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to 
July 1, 1986. 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the industrial 
commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer may 
be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the 
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the 
industrial commission may order an examination of that self-insured em-
ployer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured 
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall 
be kept confidential. 
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents compensa-
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the fund, the burden of proof 
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is on the employer or other party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim 
is presumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' compensation bene-
fits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies 
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the 
authority of the commission. 
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not 
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 
(3) (a); or 
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) 
(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay-
ment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14) (b): 
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship are 
presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the 
burden of proof being on any person seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership 
or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility 
for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct 
compensation may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover compensation or 
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is 
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b). 
(17) Any additional administrative burden imposed by amendments to Sub-
section 35-1-42 (5) during the 1988 general session of the Legislature may be 
funded out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, up to a maximum of $16,000. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987, 
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4; 1988, ch. 109, 
$ 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1) 
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for 
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it ap-
pears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to 
be individually, jointly, or severally liable" be-
fore "becomes" and inserted "or is" after "be-
comes" in the first sentence, inserted the sec-
ond sentence, added "with the exception of pen-
alties on those obligations" at the end of the 
last sentence, and made minor word changes; 
in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20K2)" at 
the end of the first sentence, substituted "com-
mission" for "attorney general", substituted 
employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his 
staff", added "and upon the request of the com-
mission, the attorney general, city attorney, or 
county attorney of the locality in which any 
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provi-
sions of this title is pending, or in which the 
employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation 
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence, 
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic 
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in 
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted 
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following 
claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensa-
tion" following "for", inserted "uninsured" be-
fore "employer" and "value of the" before 
"total", deleted "made" following "award", in-
serted "in connection with" following "in", and 
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before 
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effec-
tive February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) sub-
stituted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 59-9-
101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 
31A-3-201". 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effec-
tive July 1, 1987, in Subsection (2), in the first 
sentence substituted "under Subsection 
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections 
35-l-68-(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)." 
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The section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, in Subsection (1), divided the former first 
sentence into the present first two sentences 
and, in the second sentence, substituted "The 
fund has the purpose of assisting in the pay-
ment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's em-
ployer is individually, jointly, or severally lia-
ble to pay the benefits, but" for "for the purpose 
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits when every 
employer of the claimant who is found to be 
individually, jointly, or severally liable" and 
deleted "under this chapter" at the end; in Sub-
section (2), divided the former fourth sentence 
into the present last two sentences and deleted 
"the provisions of preceding "this title" in the 
last sentence; substituted "the employees'" for 
"their" twice in Subsection (3), "with jurisdic-
tion" for "having jurisdiction" in the second 
sentence in Subsection (4) and "workers' com-
pensation benefits" for "benefits under this 
chapter" in the first sentence of Subsection (8); 
and added Subsections (13) through (17). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. 1335 (Utah 1986); Jacobsen v. Industrial 
Comm'n & Default Indemn. Fund, 725 P.2d Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CHAPTER 2 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION 
Section Section 
35-2-1. Short title. 35-2-15. 
35-2-2. Act to be administered by Indus-
trial Commission. 
35-2-3. Exclusive remedy against em-
ployer, or officer, agent or em-
ployee — Accidental miuries 
within Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act excepted. 35-2-16. 
35-2-4. Industrial Commission may sue 
or be sued — Service of process. 35-2-17. 
35-2-5. Commission to prescribe rules 35-2-18. 
and regulations. 
35-2-6. Claims to be filed with commis-
sion. 35-2-19, 
35-2-7. Commission — Powers. 35-2-21. 
35-2-8. Depositions of witnesses. 
35-2-9. Record of proceedings. 
35-2-10. Employers enumerated and de-
fined — Regularly employed — 
Independent contractors. 35-2-22. 
35-2-11. "Employees," "workmen" and "op-
eratives" defined — Casual em-
ployment — Mining lessees and 35-2-23. 
sublessees — Partnership mem-
bers. 35-2-24. 
35-2-12. Construction of terms. 
35-2-13. Employer liability for compensa- 35-2-25. 
tion — Conditions when no pay-
ment to be made. 
35-2-14. Last employer liable — Excep- 35-2-26. 
tion. 
Benefits — Amounts — Perma-
nent total disability — Voca-
tional rehabilitation — Proce-
dure and payments — Tempo-
rary total disability — Death — 
Dependents — Medical, hospi-
tal and burial expenses. 
Employers to secure compensa-
tion — Ways allowed. 
Repealed. 
State department, commission, 
board, or agency to pay pre-
miums direct to insurance fund. 
35-2-20. Repealed. 
Employers' failure to comply a 
misdemeanor — Penalty — 
False claim by employee a mis-
demeanor — Disposition of 
funds collected. 
Noncomplying employer — To 
pay compensation — Failure to 
pay. 
Docketing of award creates lien — 
Execution. 
Judgments for nonpayment of 
premiums — Preference. 
Waiting period after disability — 
Exception as to disbursements 
and expenses. 
Occupational diseases — Proxi-
mate causation. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
(R. 224-235) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-926 & 92-1132 
* 
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent* 
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA * 
PHILLIPSEN, STEPHEN BURDELL * 
PHILLIPSEN, and JAZMIN DANIELLE * 
PHILLIPSEN, Minor Dependent * 
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN,* 
Deceased, * 
Applicants, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY * 
TRUCKING (UNINSURED), B B & B * 
TRANSPORTATION and/or WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22, 
1993, at 1:00 o,clock p.m.; same being pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield, 
Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by 
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by 
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being 
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is 
prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the 
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B 
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was 
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen. In 
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer 
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with 
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to 
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole 
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the 
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well 
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the 
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr. 
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common 
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer, 
B B & B Transportation. 
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck 
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when 
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At 
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his 
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J. 
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86), 
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle 
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92). The decedent was also married to 
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his 
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation 
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992. 
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds 
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedent's 
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law 
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to 
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie 
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that 
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to 
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal having 
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the 
Commission. Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is 
presently provided. 
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At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978 
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the 
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $305.00 
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar. When the 
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then 
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week. 
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall 
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be 
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts 
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only 
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen, 
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole 
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years 
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of 
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits. 
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case 
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of 
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund 
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the 
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant, 
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and 
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the 
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of 
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between 
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an 
independent contractor. 
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the 
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr. 
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor. The Recital 
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking 
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he 
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of 
trucking and truck driving. For these services, the Agreement 
provides that the decedent would receive 20% of the revenue 
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches 
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship 
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties 
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor 
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would 
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers 
compensation- or any other liability which might be subsequently 
imposed on Bundy. This particular provision of the contract 
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run 
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That 
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his 
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid." The 
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and 
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment. 
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it 
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of 
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not 
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck, 
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to 
drive truck. 
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor 
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v. 
Ashton, P2d 316 (Utah 1975) . In the Ashton case, the Court 
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement" 
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter. 
There the Court indicated: 
It should be had in mind that the issue is not 
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of 
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be 
determined solely from the terms used. 
Particularly, its character is not necessarily 
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites 
that it is not an employer - employee 
relationship, but is that of an independent 
contractor. The question of entitlement to 
workman's compensation depends on whether the 
facts and circumstances bring him within the 
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act. 
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is 
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides: 
* * * 
5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, 
all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontractors, 
are considered employees of the original 
employer. 
ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN, DECEASED 
ORDER 
PAGE FIVE 
Section 42, in subsection (2)(b) defines the term independent 
contractor: 
"Independent contractor" means any person 
engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution 
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control 
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
The Court in Ashton went on to state: 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who 
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a 
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as 
directed by the employer and who is subject to 
a comparatively high degree of control in 
performing those duties. In contrast, an 
independent contractor is one who is engaged 
to do some particular project or piece of 
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do 
the job in his own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is 
responsible only for its satisfactory 
completion. 
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the 
following parameters: 
The main facts to be considered as bearing on 
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever 
covenants or agreements exist concerning the 
right of direction and control over the 
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The 
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of 
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as 
compared to payment for a complete job or 
project; and (4) The furnishing of the 
equipment. (Citation omitted). 
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of 
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton, that although 
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent 
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had no real 
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for 
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to 
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever 
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy. There was no 
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to 
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr. 
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a 
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr. 
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of 
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor 
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power 
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B 
Transportation. In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a 
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . . 
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and 
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining 
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at ? 3 (A)). 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case 
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when 
it made its observation that: 
The employer wanted the "best of two possible 
worlds." On the one hand to have a person 
rendering a service over whom he can maintain 
a high degree of control, and at the same time 
give the person the status of an independent 
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he 
would have to an employee. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May 
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial 
accident. 
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease 
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That 
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain 
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to 
B B & B Transportation. That Agreement provided that B B & B 
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of 
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ." 
(Lease at f 3) . That Agreement also provided that B B & B 
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation 
coverage (Lease at f 10,) and would require that all drivers check 
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at 
f 11). The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all 
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license 
fees (Lease at J 3 (D)) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and 
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc., 
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease 
0D-22B 
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent. 
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B S 
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the 
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen. The surviving spouse of 
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with 
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required 
to report in to B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis 
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement 
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay 
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken by the 
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of 
the revenue generated. Therefore, under the terms of the 1990 
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen, 
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen. In 
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen's wages, and he owned and leased 
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of 
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme 
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980) , I find and conclude that Mark 
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation 
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court 
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's 
compensation may have two employers." 
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund and whether or not it has liability for benefits in 
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been 
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers 
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1) , to conclude that 
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1), states: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund. 
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the 
payment of workers compensation benefits to 
any person entitled to them, if that person's 
employer is individuallv-iointly, or severally 
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is 
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a 
receiver, or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to cover workers compensation 
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay 
benefits, the Fund is liable for all 
obligations of the employer as set forth in 
Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with the 
exceptions of penalties on those obligations. 
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that it is 
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B & B 
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the 
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay 
benefits. That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect 
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment 
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §35-1-
107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of 
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment 
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only 
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word 
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Commission, 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987). 
In that case, the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah litigated whether or not every employer 
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers 
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the 
term every meant what it said, and, as such, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case, 
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administra-
tive Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the 
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite 
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent 
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be triggered. To 
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged 
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by 
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to 
§3 5-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take. 
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would 
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several 
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer 
being unable to pay benefits in a case. 
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the 
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid 
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50% 
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without 
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then 
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall 
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead. 
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel 
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to a fee 
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum 
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on 
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the 
v .'- i"^0*S 
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the 
applicant's benefits, which will result in a deduction of $1,875.00 
from each child's accrued award. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark 
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal 
industrial accident. In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a 
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when 
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation 
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death 
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the 
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10, 
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to 
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally 
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death 
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or 
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the 
award in this matter. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
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from the accrued award to Shay la, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/ or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen. 
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services 
rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail 
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148 
West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 84648. Mrs. Phillipsen shall 
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers 
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax 
returns. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or 
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of 
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be 
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously 
provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 1997, the 
Workers Compensation Fund shall send Declaration of Dependency 
..vv:?. 
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forms to Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination of the 
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children 
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits 
received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall 
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be 
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this 
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis. In the event Mark 
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and 
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this 
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments 
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah on a quarterly basis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
aien 
administrative Law Judge 
rt day of Certified this £ 
May, 1993. 
Patricia 0. Ashby / 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Robert T\ Phillipsen, Deceased, was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Melanie Phillipsen 
148 West 100 North, #A-1 
Nephi, UT 84648 
Kevin Sutterfield 
Attorney at Law 
P. O, Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mark Bundy Trucking 
P. 0. Box 192 
Nephi, UT 84648 
Stuart Weed 
Attorney at Law 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
SLC, UT 84111-1004 
B B & B Transportation 
P. 0. Box 7061 
Murray, UT 84107 
Thomas Sturdy 
Attorney at Law 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P. 0. Box 57929 
SLC, UT 84157 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ikXjJ-yY^ fhLmAa\^/r\vr\ 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
(R. 224-275-281) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent * 
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA * 
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL * 
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE * 
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent * 
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON, * 
Deceased. * 
vs. * 
MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING * 
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION * 
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS7 FUND,* 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the 
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The minor dependent children of Robert T. Phillipson 
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death 
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father. 
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the 
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge 
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was 
Mr. Phillipson's common law or actual employer and ordered that the 
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and 
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits 
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 50% of the 
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets 
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy. 
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB 
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an 
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review 
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits 
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award. 
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the 
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following 
additional finding: 
1. Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of 
his fatal industrial accident. 
ORDER 
GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case Nos. 92-926 
& 92-1132 
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I. WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER? 
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and, 
therefore, solely liable for his workers7 compensation benefits. 
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B 
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A 
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer 
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the 
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be 
presumed liable unless it can be shown that the special employer 
has been substituted for the general employer. To overcome the 
presumption, the evidence must show: (1) a contract of hire 
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the 
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of 
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer 
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Id. at 8-
457. 
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and 
control is the most important factor for determining whether an 
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides 
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be 
implied by conduct of the parties.3 
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby 
decedent agreed to Mreceiv[e] dispatches from BB & B 
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991. 
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten 
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the 
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis. 
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB & 
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself 
and BB & B. 
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route 
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General 
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The 
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB 
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the 
work of BB & B and not Bundy. 
1
 See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48.00. (1992 Ed.) 
2
 Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1975) . 
3
 Bambrouah v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976). 
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The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that 
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the 
Leased Equipment" and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the 
complete care, custody and control of both the Leased Equipment and 
drivers furnished therewith..." (emphasis added). The agreement 
further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive 
responsibility for: (A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and 
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising, 
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B 
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work. Bundy's 
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who 
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to 
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the 
application of the loaned servant doctrine.4 
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees 
that was granted in the Lease Agreement. BB & B required the 
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m. 
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B 
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy. 
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the 
right to control the work of the decedent. 
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide 
workers' compensation insurance. Therefore, a preponderance of 
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned 
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal 
industrial accident.6 Therefore, the liability for payment of 
4
 "It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned 
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely 
surrender all control over his loaned employee." Bambrouah v. 
Bethers at 1292. 
5
 "It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for 
obligations he assumes by contract." Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). 
6
 This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner 
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne, the employee 
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which 
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee. In the present 
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of 
his injury. The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would 
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the 
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract 
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation 
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the 
rv/\0*JV"* 
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workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its 
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the 
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded. 
We will not address the additional issues raised by the 
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the 
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order of the 
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as 
follows: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J. 
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account 
without the written authorization of the Commission upon 
a showing of need. The benefits awarded herein shall 
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25 
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997. 
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct 
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall 
remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the 
applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need* The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
drivers. 
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit 
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o 
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 
84648. Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America 
Credit Union with social security numbers for the 
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax 
returns. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B 
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall 
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the 
sum of $7500.00, for services rendered in this matter, 
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the 
children as previously provided. 
ROBERT T\ 
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PHILLIPSON 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall send 
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson 
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the 
children herein. Thereafter, the children will be 
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death 
benefits received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty 
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or 
appeal. 
DATED this /^ y^ /*%v^ l day of ^ v ^ u 1994. 
^SAin 4 A 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission 
must be filed within 20 days of the date of this Order. A request 
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
must be filed within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA 
MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on .ajH^day of 
Ir) i^t^cJ-- 19_T£ to the following: n 
MELANIE PHILLIPSEN 
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1 
NEPHI, UTAH 84648 
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING 
P O BOX 192 
NEPHI, UTAH 846548 
STUART WEED 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1004 
B B & B TRANSPORTATION 
P O BOX 7061 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
THOMAS STURDY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 
CINDY PETERSON 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION 
P O BOX 45001 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
T. C. ALLEN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Adell But^r-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsel's Office 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
(EX. D-1, R. 329-340, 370) 
[AHSPOnTATIOH, INC. 
LEASE AOREEHBHr, Exaouted this /<£ day VZ^^/LLM.'U/ A*98 by and 
between BB4B, INC./dbaBB&B TRAtflPORTAIIOH, 1HC. (Lesssc), a corporation 
of Utah, 4154 8o» 300 West, Hurray, Ut 84107 and
 rn. 
Of 
(laaamO „ 
VIT1C8SRH1 
WHEREAS, LESSEE is an irregular rout* for-hire carrier holding 
operating authority issued by the Interstate Caauseree Ooudsaion (ICC) 
in Docket # HC174343 (and tub numbers thereunder), authorising the 
transportation of General Coamoditlea betueen points in the Contin-
ental United States) and 
W1EREA3, Sasior control* a actor Tehiola whioh i t available for 
Lessee'a use and suitable for transportation of the specified ooaoscdltiea 
authorised for transportation by Lessee f and 
WHEREAS Lessor desires to lease such vehicle to Leasee of & long-
ter* basis and Lessee desires to lease such Motor vehicle fro« Lessor) 
HOW', 'THEREFORE, in consideration of aufaual agreeaante and under-
takings contained herein, and on the tarts and conditions expressed belpv 
the parties hereto COY-riant and agree as followst 
1# LEASE OF EQUIPMENT* Lessor hereby leases to Leasee and Lessee 
hereby aooepts fro» Lessor, *2 tractor (a) and
 -te—i.se»i-.trailer(B) 
(oolleotivly the "Leased Eqidpnsnt") acre fully described on Exhibit RAV 
attaohed hereto and mde a part of by reference, for the tare specified 
herein, beginning ^liv/ity /6> .19%? . 
2. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LSB3EE« The Leased Equipment i s to be 
engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee, and the goods trans-
ported therein shall be transported pursuant to the direotion of and 
under exclusive oontrol and supervision of the Lessee. ' X K ^ ^ 
EXHIBIT E-1 of ,2 'NDUSTRIALCOMMISS.OM - ' ^ 
SMI -
IANSPORTATION, INC. 
3» EXCLUSIVE COHTROL IH IES3EE. Lei SOT shall furnish t driver or 
drirtrB far each unit of the Leased Squipeenfe. lessee shall hare the com-
plete care, custody and control of both the Leased Squiprent anl drivers 
furniehed therewith) provided however that Lessor shall have full eld 
exclusive responsibility for) 
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and 
ad Justing the grievanoes of (Supervising) training) disciplining) and firing 
of al l drivers) drivers helpers and other workers necessary for the per-
for oenc e of Lessor's obligations unier the terse of this Agree rent) which 
driver, driver's helpers and other workers are,anl shall be, either the 
pnplcy are a of the Lessor or under the direot econoedo oontroi of the Lessor) 
(B) paying all operating and related expenses far the Leased Bquiprtnt, 
including a l l expenses of fuel) oil and repairs to the Leased Equipment, road 
taxes, tdleage taxes, fines far perking) moving or overweight violations) 
licenses, paradts or any other levies or aseesaneata based upon the oper-
ation of Leased Equipment, and; 
(0) paying 'and reporting as required by an •aploytr, as explained 
Mare fully below* Subject in each ease to any rsqulreaents which say be 
placed upon Lessee by applicable statutes, and regulations promulgated 
thereunder,.It i s understood by the parties that soaa i t ana creating 
the foregoing expenses nay be arranged far by the Lessee far Isssar, as 
expressly'described below) and Lessor shall reiaburse Lessee therefore 
instead' of paying suoh.expenses directlyy as in autually agreed by the 
parties froi tine to tine. 
*• HAHffgffA«CB AM COMPLIANCE MQlttMHEMTS. The parties ackncvlege 
that Leasees oparations are Subject to regulation by tbe federal 
governwnt through the ICG and the U«3« Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and by various state and local governments. Lessor shall have tbe respon-
sibility to Lessee far compliance with suoh regulatory requirements relating 
to the operation of the Leased Equipment) subject at al l times 
to verification by Lessee by) 
(A) *dntaining the Leased Equipment pursuant to the Agreement in 
the*manner required by all applicable regulations) 
P.O. SOX 70S 1 
4IM SOUTH 900 EAST 
UUfiRAY, UTAH UW 
(B01)MEMM2 
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(B) operating laid equipaent in aoocrd with* al l applioabla statutes 
and regulationsj 
(C) providing tbereunUr only thoaa drivsri who ars qutlifisd unisr 
a l l applioabla regulation! and csrtifisd tbarato by Lessee| 
(D) upon autual agreeaent between Leasee ard Lessor, furnishing and 
relinquishing to Lessee tho possession, oontrol and uaa of tha actor vehicle 
which Leasee aay require to full f i l l requireaenta plaoad upon i t by appli-
oabla atatutad and regulations( 
(B) performance of aota naoaaaary to ooaply with tha applicable atatuss 
and regulations in carrying out i t a dutiaa undar this agraaaant< 
(r) aa part of i t a responsibilities hereunder, Lessor shall furnish 
to Leasee a l i s t of lessor's qualified drivers and any supporting doouaan-
tation relating tbarato that Lessee say, froa tiaa to tiao, reasonably 
requaat«Lsasaa i s hereby granted tha right to request Lessor not to use an/ 
particular driver and, upon such request froa Lessee', Lessor shall eosply 
therewith. 
5« UNAUTHORIZED USB OF 1£A3BD BQUIPHBHT» Under no oireuaatanoes during 
the tern of this agreeaent shall La ssor utiliie tha Leased Equipaant for 
tha transportation of ooeaoditiee which Leasee ia not allowed to carry 
under i t s operating authority issued by tha ICO in Docket I H0174343 ( « 
any other transportation for which the Lessee i s not authorised under tha 
Act and Regulations thereunder)* Tha parties aaknowledge that such unauth-
orised use of tha Leased Equipaent say Jeopardise Lessee* s continued oper-
ations as an authorised carrier far-hire. In the event that Lessor shall 
utilise tha Leased Equipaent far suoh unauthorised service and euoh actions 
result in amotions i»po*ed upon Lessee by any governaental authority, 
Lessor shall b* liabls %o Lessee for &ny and all costs ard daaages, both 
direct and consequential, pursuant to the provisions of Section 11 below. 
P.O. BOX 7051 
4t54SOUTH«»EA8T 
MWWAY,UiAHS4l0r 
(801)283-2981 
rRANSPOBTATION, INC. 
6. TRIP DOCUMENTATIOH TO L£3SEg. For each individual trip undertaken 
by tha Leased Eqidpasnt, Lessor shall furnish to La Be* a, as Boon aa i s 
practical folloving tha ooapletion of said trip, tha foliating doouasnt* 
ard information) 
(A) Lessee's over-the road trip import. 
(B) signed delivery reoaipts and raoeipted biUa of lading) 
(0) ourrant driver's chauffer's license and aadieal certificate) 
(D) dritars loga (properly completed as required by applicable lav 
and regulations thereunder)} 
(B) eileege report (an axaaple of vhioh ia on trip sheet) 
(F) original fuel tickets and state fuel reportai (which are to be 
exeouted in the name of Leasee)) 
(Q) oopiaa of local, stats or federal inspection and violation noticest 
(H) detention tisn records (on a fora acceptable to Leasee and aa 
specified under applicable regulations promulgated by the ICC, i f tha trip 
i s conducted under common carrier authority)) 
(X) suoh pr.e,tripor other vehicle inspection report as my be required 
by tha ICC or DOS 
With respaot to said inspection re ports
 t, Lessee reserve* the right to pre-
scribe the fora on vhioh suoh inspections are to be reported* Said doouaenta 
and information say be assembled and Bailed to Lessees principal office, as 
identified, above) in an envelope provided by Leasee* 
7. Revis ion of mBioffr BILLS AND EXAMINATION or-TAnirre m BCHEPULSSI 
Leesar may examine the schedules of actual rates and ehergee and/or tariffs 
vhioh Lessee has filed with the ICC and froa vhioh the fcregoing peroentagea 
of rerenue are determined at Lessee's offioea at K\% South 300 West 
Murray, Ut« at any time during ncreal business hours (8 e«a. to 5 p.a. monday 
through fridey), or i f i t so slaots, the Leaser amy subscribe to copies of 
said schedule s and tariffs by paying to Leesee the proper ohargaa therefore* 
4154 SOUTH 500 EAST 
MUWUY,UTAHM10r 
fsoiit&ussa — 
l&I -
ASPORTATION, I H C . 
8. DEDOCHOW OF 5UH3 Wl MEIQHT LQ33 and/or DAHAOX. U a i l i reserves 
the right to deduct froa any rental pay as nt due to the Lessor such sua* 
te Lessee i s required to pay to any consignor or consignee for loss or 
daa&ge to any coaaodities transported by the Leafed Cqidpaant* Pricr to eeldng 
euoh deduction, Lessee shall furniah^to Lesser a ooaplete eopy of the 
Lessee's olaia f i l e vith copies of the documentation upon v hi oh tba 
•aid olaia vat paid* 
9. tfARIUHttE3 AH) ItCEHHIFICATIOH* In consideration of Leasee*• 
agreeaent to lease the Leased Eqtdpaent, Lessor hereby warrants, covenant* 
and agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Leasee harass ss froa and against 
a 11 elaiae, obligations^ lo s s , dacage, penalities or expense; direct of 
consequential, including without limitation a l l costs and reasonable legal 
fees
 9 insured, by Lessee , direetly or indirectly, froa the operation of the 
Leased Bqudpaent during the tar a of this agreeaent and a l l acts cr omissions 
of LessoTf i t s eaplcyees, representatives* offloers er assigns, pursuant 
to the teres of this agreeaent, including, by vay of exaapla and not of 
limitation, claims f ines, farfotures and revocations by the ICO, the DOT 
and/or any other governaantal authority, and claims by third parties 
for personal injury cr property damage* 
10. IMURAHCg RgQUUlEHEHTS. 
(A) It i s understood and acknowledged by the parties that Lessee has 
procured end aaintaina in fu l l force and effect, policies of Insurance 
toverlng personal injury, (Workmen's Ooapensation Insurance), property 
laaage and daaage to cargo far the benefit of the public as required by 
.9 U.3.C, 8 10927) however, for the purpose of this Agreement and i n crdar to 
utisfy the requireaents of Section 9* above, the Lessor shall procure and 
ointain, at i t s own expense, public l iabi l i ty and property daaage insurance 
i th a total ecabined single 11 ait of not l sss than $1,000,000 per oocurance, 
nd a l l -r id* cargo insurance vith a l iab i l i ty limit of act lass than 
50,000 per unit of Leased Equip cent. Lessor and i t s insurance earrier(s) 
hall , by continuing end crsement, include Lessee on a l l such insurance 
alleles as an edditional insured and shall , prior to the tiaa that Lessee 
ikes- poeeesaion of Leased Equlpeant hereuixlsr, furnish to the Leasee a 
irtifieate er certificates eridencing such policies and/or endarseaantSa 
p.o.aox roe i 
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If, however, Leaaar tnd its inaurance carrier (a) eannot provide auoh 
certificates to Lessee prior to the tiaa Lessee takes possession of the 
Leaa*** Equipment hereunder, in lieu of auoh insurance certificates) 
Lsesor and ita insurance oarrier (a) may provide evidence of auoh insurance 
by telegram or other for* of written ooaaunication actually dtlitered to 
Lees" prior to taking auoh poeaaaaion, and Lessee shall by intitlod to 
rely on auoh telegram or other for a of written communication* Not 
withstanding the foregoing, i f Leaaee accepts auoh telagraphio or other 
written fori of evidence, Leesar and ita insurance carrier (a) shall furnish 
the actual certificate cr eertifioates within five (5) days of the data 
of execution of this Lease Agreement* Prior to cancellation:^» non-renewal 
of, av material change in aueh policies and/or endorsements, or the de-
lation of the Leasee aa an additionally insured under auoh policies• upon 
renewal or otherwise, Leaaar and i ts insurance carrier (a) shall furnish 
Lessee with thirty (30) days notice in writing thereof, and Lessor's 
insurance carrier (s) shall indicate of the certificate(3) provided to 
Leasee i t s (their) promtae to eoaply with thia notice provision*, anything 
in thift agreement to the contrary notwithstanding! for the purposes of the 
parties to thia Agreement, said insurance procured and maintained by the 
Lessor under this Section shall by considered and constitute primary 
insurance coverage. If any of said policies and/or endorsements are 
cancelled, or not renewed without notification to Leasee aa required in this 
Section, this Agreement shall be deemed cancelled and terminated, as of 
the date of such policy and/or endarseaent cancellation or expiration* 
(b) Lessor shall'have the option of .satisfying the requiraaerita of 
Section 9 above by providing insurance aa set forth in paragraph 10(A) 
or by participating in the insurance coverage prograi of the Leant. In 
the atent Lessor eleots to satisfy the requirments of Seetion 10 above by 
participating in the exiating insurance program of Lasaee, Lessor shall 
give written notioe to Lessee of the exercise of said option prior to the 
tlaa Lssieo takes possession of the Laased Equipment hereunder, i f said 
option i« exeroiaed, Leesor expresaly hereby autboriiea leaaee to deduct the 
ooatf-of such lnaurance for each pLeae of Leased Equipment covered hereby 
from a»V •oniea dua and owing by Leaaaa to Lai**. 
TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
BaB -
ASPORTATION, INC. 
11. CARE. CUSTODY AM CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT.Aa provided in Seotion 1 
above, i t la understood and acknowledged by both parties that tba exclusive 
care, custody and oonbrol of tha Leased Bquipaent shall ba in Lasses for 
the t e n of thii Agreenent. Any other provision of this Agreement not-
withstanding, i t la further understood, aid acknowledged .that Leaner cannot 
laaae tha Leased Bquipaent to any other person or perform actor trans-
portation aerrice for any other parson without the prior oonsest of Leasee. 
If Lessor shall, without Leaeee^s prior consent, lease tha Leased Equipment 
to to any other person or perforp transportation services therewith, Las ear 
shall pay to Leasee tha sua of One Hundred Dollars ($100*00) per eaoh such 
ooouranoe as liquidated das&ges farbraaoh of this provision. Nothing in 
this Section shell be construed, however; as superceding or •edify any of 
Lessor'• other obligations or Lessee's other raaedies under this Agreeaeat. 
(t) It i s understood tnl acknowledged by both parties that upon 
violation of this provision in the Agreement can by i'mmsdiata cause for 
termination of Lease Agreeaetit. 
(b) I f Lessor, i s asked| either by Dispatoh or other authority with 
Lessee, for help with loading and Lessor is able to proaure a load. Lasses 
HOST have particular load approved thru Dispatoh before commiting to or 
loading said load. All Loads MUSI BE APPROVED, booked and billed thru tha 
Salt Lake office, NO EXCEPTIONS Lessee agrses to work on a flat ioj for all 
loads that art procured thru Lessor's own effort*, providing that Lessor 
handles a l l of his ovn advancing nf money and Trip-Leasing* B B 4 B TJIANS-
PCRTAIIOH* IH0« under no cirauwtancaa, will advance aoney on sow one slsts 
freight. 
12. CHECK - IH PIPER DISPATCH» There will by a HAMATCR! eall-oheek in 
before 1ChOQ AH Mountain TIDB eaoh Monday thru Friday while Lessor i s under 
a dispatoh.rines VILL be levied at tha rate of $50.00 per each violation 
of this provision at tins of settle rent per eaoh individual load that oall 
was not made. 
P.O. SOX 7061 
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13. ADVAHCIH3 OH LOADS (FASTRACK3)t Lessee ia set up on an adYanoing 
•ystai oalled Fastraok. Thii allows ua to giya Laaaor a series of nuabers 
(15 digits) worth up to 11,000.00. There is a charge that will be absorbed 
by the Laaaor of $3*?0 per transaction, All advances HU3T be taken during 
ncraal business hours (8too AH to $t,oo PH, Hon-Fri). There are jJQ, advancing 
faraa takan out of tha offioa after hours* Wa bewe had a problaa in tha 
Past with losing forae that have been taken out ao there will be abaolutly 
*w adranoing on weekends or lata at night* 
14. DISPATCH (LOAD) MfflnS OH PAPSnVffiXt All bills of lading, straight 
bdlla, photo-oopya, aigned delivery receipts, or freight billa turned in 
far billing purpoaaa or payaant to tha B B4 B Transportation offioa HUST 
have either a dispatoh or Fro nuaber that i s given to Lessor at tins of 
loading, proaantently Barked and circled on each bil l of lading pertaining 
to that particular load. If paperwork i s turned in without a Dispatoh 
Vuaban inert v i l l be a deduotion of $30.00 par each* bi l l of lading that 
ia not ao Barked, 
15. PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO EQUIPHBHT. Lessee shall have no responsibility 
vhaia oarer for losa or dr-sage to the Leased Equipoent during the tar a of this 
fcgraeaont ani Laaaor hereby, for i tsel f„ i t s suooessors and assigns and i ts 
insurers, as tha oaae say be, waiYaa any claisfl i t nay hate against tha 
Lea eat fcr such daaage or deatruotion. 
16* TAXED AH) UNTrcRH CAB (SARDS. Lessee shall furnish to Laaaor, at 
so-rt, .»D" Urdfora Gab cards (HATIUC) and will handle paysent ( to be da-
ducted frosi sattleaant) of fuel taxes far cost of expenses thereof J the 
bsjsdling. of all other taxes including but not United to, highway use 
tajcaa and groae ton aileaga taxes, shell b« tha sole responsibility of tha 
17. CIURQg-BACK ITBK3. It is understood and aoknowladged that upon the 
t«raination or cancellation of this agreement tha Laaaor shall return to 
Leasee any "D" Unifora Cab Cards (HARUO) fur ni a hod far operations hereunder 
ajsd alao shall return any and al l signs, placards, or Barkings, license 
sl^tea, all licensing cards, fuel permits, ha.sardoue p»r*ite, and anything 
•£»• furniahad by B B 4 B Tranaportation at the tiao of Lease. If said iteaa 
«-a not returned within tan (10) days following the data of aueh termination 
- - J-J..-* -ivnVi «nafea froa any rental payaants 
P.O. BOX 70S1 
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dining due ard payable to the Lessor* Lea we Bay also oharge b*ok to 
a Lea tor all oosts paid for fuel taxes ttxl said charge back shall be 
de by deduction from rental payments due to the Lessor* 
18* RESPONSIBIL^ Tr, FCR COSTS, Unless expressly prorided to the con-
ary elsewhere herein, the LeBBor shall be responsible for and shall pay 
m cost of al l fuels, lubricating oi ls , repairs, fuel taxes• enpty mLlasge 
raits of al l kinds and types (except operating authorities granted by the 
!C or State Regulatory Agendas) to l l s , ferries, base plates and other Ttb-
le licenses • 
19* PlflCHASEa gflOH IES3EB The Lessor i s not required to purohase cr 
nt any products, equipment or servioes froa lessee as a condition for 
ntering 'into the Agreement* 
20, TERM klV HQTICB. This Agreement shall oantinus for a periM of 
drty 'one- (31) days froa the date specified in Section 1 above and there-
'fcer until cancelled upon thirty (30) days written notice by either party*"— 
t the event notice i s to be given pursuant to any provision bf this Agree-* 
mt i f to Lessee, i t shall be sent) by certified sail , postage pre-paidf 
» telegram toi B B ft B TUAHSPCRTATIOH,IHC, 
PO Box 7061 
Murray| Ut* S4107 
sl> i f Lessor, i t shall be senb tor 
—Af*>t/L tegjf— 
We,/>A>' U^L *Ut4X 
ritben notice shall be considered sufficient i f nailed postage prepaid* 
irtified or registered mail to the above respective address* Either party 
>y change .such notice address at any tine by notice in writing to the other* 
21. SUBSTITUriOH Of EQUIPHEHf. In the event any vehicle leased to Leasee 
orsuant to this Agreement shall, for any reason, fail to coaplate operation 
9 des t inat ion , Laeeee shal l have the right to forward the Load or any part 
hereof as my be necessary by any weans or vebiale with the leapt posaibla 
• lay , and ehal l deduct froa any aaount due Lessor the cost and expense there 
r. 
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22. IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES, Leasee shall provide all 
identification required by governmental agencies to be affixed 
~o the Leased Equipment, and Lessor will be required to have 
company name on truck and necessary decals. Lessor shall 
promptly remove and return such identification on the termina-
tion or cancellation of thi-s Agreement. 
23. BREACH OF CONTRACT/TERMINATION, In the event either party 
commits a naterial breach of any term of this Agreement, the other 
party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately 
and hold the breaching party liable for damages occasioned by 
such breach, including Attorney fees and Court coats, 
24. COPIES IN VEHICLE, Lessor covenants, represents and 
guarantees that a signed copy of this Agreement, or statement as 
tuth6ri2ed by 49 C.F.R.S. 1057. 11(c) (2), shall be carried in 
each unit of the Leased Equipment at all times this Agreement is 
in effect. 
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement 
of the day and year first above written* 
B B & B TRANSPORTATION, INC 
m 
i^OR&WPA 'LESSOR; CM  AN It NAME* 
fe^f ^ ^ g - A 
lANSPOnTATlON, INC. 
LEASE EQUIPMENT AGREEMENT 
L E S S O R ^ 
P.O. BOX 7061 
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COMPENSATION SCHEDULE 
Lessee will deduct as fair^and equitable compensation fron 
each and every ahipment and/or load tranaported by virtue of 
Lessee's Common Carrier Authority HC 174343 end sub-paragraphs 
thereof 15X or $50.00 which ever ia greater of the gross receipts 
All monies are due and payable according to the terms and condi-
tions of the Lease Agreement. Settlements are guaranteed due to 
Lessor not later than thirty (30)days after bills are received in 
the office and able to forward. Payroll and settlements are 
done ONCE a week, on Fridays. If Lessee is paid before the 
thirty* (30) days are expired, and there is no claim of damage or 
shortage or a claim of any kind, on the load, Lessor will be 
Lessor will be settled on the Friday closest. 
LESSEE j0(A/,d >A./!/j49i> LESSORX %7**A Z2<+*td(J 
*Wl B TRANSPORTATION. INC ' ^ B'fc^& I N,
DATE V - ^ dittfttif / £ . ;9</d DATE \r JL-/t-*4> 
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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT 
(EX. D-3, R. 354-356, 374-375) 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT 
Contract made / ~ 22 ~ , 1990 » between Mark Bundy 
of A7*f? M *Cto£. City of f/tft; grU , County (Tu^S 
State of Utah, herein referred to as Owner and nt>4ej-T fA7//,/?£<^ 
o f
 $xf+ 6°- /** £ < • City of A/cft/ 6/TAA 
County of Tfu^A # State of Utah, herein referred 
to as Contractor. 
RECITALS 
1. Owner owns certain truck(s) and trucking equipment and 
operates a truck ownership business at the address set forth 
above, and Owner desires to contract with Contractor to have 
Contractor perform the following services: trucking and 
truck driving. 
2. Contractor desires to perform these services for 
Owner under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. 
3. Owner desires to terminate all existing agreements and 
understandings with Contractor and in lieu thereof, enter into 
this Agreement, providing, among other things, for his services. 
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth herin, it 
is agreed by and between Owner and Contractor: 
SECTION ONE 
REPEAL OF EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS/DESCRIPTION OF WORK 
Any and all agreements heretofore entered into between 
Owner and Contractor are terminated, and each of the parties hereby 
releases and discharges the other from any and all obligations and 
liabilities heretofore or now existing by reason for any such 
agreements, it being the intention of the Owner and Contractor 
that this- Agreement shall supersede and be in lieu of any and all 
prior agreements or understandings between them. 
The work to be performed by Contractor includes all services 
generally performed by Contractor in a trucker's usual line of 
business, including, but not limited to, the following: receiving 
dispatches from u fl *h/l TA^nS^^T^1/9Aox other trucking .firm 
with which Owner may enter into business relationships), picking 
up loads, transporting loads to destinations and return. All 
work performed by Contractor in connection with such services 
shall be performed solely under the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement. -c * 
SECTION TWO 
PAYMENT 
/tc^l Owner will pay Contractor the total sum of $ Jt& 5% per 
wild (figured from start of trip to end of trip) for the work 
INDUSTRIAL COMM!*""" H^ 
to be performed under this contract. In order to receive payment, 
Contractor must submit an envelope with receipts, bills of 
lading, etc., and any other reques*ted/required information to 
Owner upon completion ot tne trip. Wicnin five (5) working days of 
receipt of such envelope, Owner will make payment to Contractor. 
SECTION THREE 
RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES 
The parties intend this contract to create an employer-
independent contractor relationship. Owner is interested only in 
the results to be achieved, and the methods, means, manner, and 
conduct of the work will be under the sole control of the 
Contractor* Contractor may excercise his independent judgement 
as to the hours of employment, place where services will be 
rendered, methods of performing such services, etc. 
Contractor is not to be considered an agent or employee of 
Owner for any prupose, and the Contractor and any of Contractor's 
employees are not entitled to any of the benefits that Owner may 
provide for Owner's employees, if any. With the relationship 
between the parties being owner-independent contractor, Owner 
will have no responsibility or obligation for wage withholding 
for income tax (federal or state), social security, unemployment 
insurance, worker's compensation, health, life or disability 
insurance, or to respond to garnishments for alimony, child 
support, indebtedness, or similar items. In additon, Owner has 
no obligation to include Contractor in any health insurance, life 
insurance, disability insurance, pension, profit sharing, stock 
purchase or shimilar plans. 
Contractor covenants to save Owner harmless from any and all 
liability for withholding federal or state income tax, workers 
compensation contribution, unemployment insurance and any 
Contractor's tax liability now or subsequently imposed on Owner. 
Contractor waives all claims against Owner which Contractor may 
now have or may subsequently acquire for Owner's liability for 
worker's compensation, unemployment insurance or otherwise under 
the laws.* of the United States or the State of Utah. 
It is understood that Owner does not agree to use Contractor 
exclusively. Nothing herein shall be deemed to restrict Owner's 
right to employ other persons either as employees or independent 
contractors. 
SECTION FOUR 
DUTIES OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES 
Owner will supply* the truck(s) and trucking equipment, be 
responsible for licensing the truck(s), carrying insurance on the 
2 
truck(s) and for all regular or extended maintenance of the 
truck(s)• 
Contractor assumes all responsibility for performance of this 
Agreement. In the performance of the work provided for herein, 
Contractor agrees to conduct such work in full compliance with 
any and all applicable laws, rules and regulations promulgated or 
adopted by any governmental agency or regulatory body, both state 
and federal. Contractor covenants to perform such work in a good 
and workmanlike manner. Contractor will maintain,\for the 
duration of this contaract, all necessary Department of Transportatior 
and State of Utah health and driver's licensing qualifications. 
The work to be performed under this Agreement will be performed 
entirely at Contractor's risk. Contractor agrees to indemnify 
Owner for any and all liability or loss arising in any way out 
of the performance of this contract. 
SECTION FIVE 
DURATION/TERMINATION 
Either party may cancel this Agreement at any time for any 
reason, cause or no cause. 
SECTION SIX 
MISCELLANEOUS 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereunder. 
No waiver, alteration, or modification of the provisions of 
this Agreement shall be binding unless in writing and signed 
by Mark Bundy and Contractor. 
Any assignment of this Agreement by Contractor without the 
prior written consent of Owner shall be void. 
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utal 
Tn witness whereof, the parties have executed this agreement at 
/-^/?-» *ft the day and year first above written. 
Mafck Bunuy «•* 
Owner 
Contractor 
3 
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CHARLES KINNE 
V. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) 
926 Utah 609 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Charles KINNE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Defendant 
No. 16447. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 5, 1980. 
Owner of tractor sought review of an 
order of the Industrial Commission which 
found joint and several liability on the part 
of the owner and the corporate lessee of the 
tractor, as employers of a driver who was 
killed in a tractor accident The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) the Com-
mission's conclusion that the driver was in 
the course of his employment at the time of 
the accident was supported by substantial 
evidence; (2) the owner of the tractor was 
the driver's employer, for workmen's com-
pensation purposes; and (3) both the owner 
and the lessee were liable. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation *»1719 
Whether an accidental injury arises out 
of or within the scope of employment de-
pends on the particular circumstances of 
each case. 
2. Workers' Compensation «»635 
Where truck driver's practice was to 
take tractor to his home where he cleaned 
and serviced it and where it was understood 
that this maintenance work was the driver's 
responsibility and the work was done with 
the knowledge of both the owner and the 
lessee of the tractor and where, on weekend 
preceding fatal accident the driver had tak-
en the tractor home and had performed 
certain required repairs on it for the benefit 
of the owner and the lessee and in accord 
with the agreement between the two, the 
driver was in the course of his employment 
when, while en route from his home to the 
lessee's place of business to pick up a trailer 
and commence the final portion of a trip, 
the tractor was struck by a train and the 
driver was killed. 
1 Workera' Compensation *»210 
Where agreement for lease of tractor 
gave the tractor owner the legal right of 
direction and control over the driver and 
where, under the terms of the agreement, 
the owner also had the right to hire and fin 
drivers and was responsible for paying the 
drivers' wages, the owner was the employer 
of a tractor driver, for workmen's compen-
sation purposes, even though the tractor 
was under lease to corporate leasee when 
the driver was killed while driving the trac-
tor. 
4. Workers' Compensation *»3M 
Fact that agreement for lease of trae-
tor provided that the tractor's owner would 
maintain workmen's compensation coverage 
for drivers did not permit the lesaee of the 
tractor, the statutory employer of a driver 
who was killed while driving the tractor, to 
avoid its liability for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits. 
5. Contracts *»1 
It is not unreasonable to hold a party 
responsible for obligations he assumes by 
contract 
«. Contracts ^187(1) 
Where agreement for lease of tractor 
provided that owner would maintain work-
men's compensation coverage for drivers 
and since the driven stood in the position of 
third-party beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween the owner and the leasee, the owner 
could not avoid liability for workmen's com-
pensation benefits as spelled out by the 
terms of the signed agreement even though 
the leesee, as statutory employer, was also 
responsible for workmen's compensation 
coverage. 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Frank V. 
Nelson, Asst Atty. Gen., M. David Eckera-
ley of Black & Moore, Andrew R. Hurlay of 
Lowe & Huriey, Salt Lake City, for defand-
ant 
KINNE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ctoM,uufciier.Mtss 
Utah 927 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Charles Kinne, sought review of 
an order of the State Industrial Commission 
which found joint and several liability on 
the part of Kinne and Freeport Transport, 
Inc., u employers of Max L Wynn, who 
was killed in a tractor accident Kinne 
contends the facts do not support the Com-
mission's findings (1) that Wynn's accident 
occurred in the course of his employment 
and (2) that Kinne was Wynn's employer. 
In May 1976 Kinne entered into an agree-
ment with Freeport Transport, Inc., provide 
ing for the lease of a tractor owned by 
Kinne to Freeport Pursuant to the writ-
ten agreement, Kinne was to be responsible, 
inter slit, for the direction, control, salaries, 
and workmen's compensation coverage of 
his employees. Freeport assumed liability 
for injuries resulting from the negligent 
operation of the vehicle involving others 
than Kinne or his employees. Kinne failed 
to provide workmen's compensation cover-
age. 
In November 1976, Max L. Wynn, who 
had been hired by Kinne as a driver, took 
the tractor home during an interruption in 
a trip from Colorado to California. When 
he was en route from his home to Free-
port's place of business in Clearfield, Utah, 
to pick up a trailer and commence the final 
portion of the trip, the tractor was struck 
by a train and Wynn was killed. 
Wynn's widow filed for workmen's com-
pensation benefits. In July 1978 the Indus-
trial Commission's administrative law judge 
determined that Wynn was not in the scope 
and course of his employment at the time of 
the accident, and compensation benefits 
were therefore denied. The judge also 
found that Wynn was an employee of Free-
port and not of Kinne. In February 1979 
the Commission granted Mrs. Wynn's mo-
tion for review and held that Wynn was in 
the course of his employment when he was 
killed and that Mrs. Wynn was entitled to 
benefits. In response to an inquiry as to 
joint liability by the State Insurance Fund, 
Freeport's insurer, the Commission by sup-
plemental order held that Wynn was an 
employee of Kinne under the terms of the 
lease agreement and that Kinne was there-
fore jointly and severally liable with Free-
port for the compensation award. Kinne's 
appeal is from that order. 
An order of the Industrial Commission 
will stand unless it is contrary to law or 
unsupported by substantial evidence, f 86-
1-64 U.OA. (1*8), as amended. Kinne ar-
gues that the Commission erred in its find* 
ings that Wynn was in the coarse of his 
employment at the time of the fatal acci-
dent and that Kinne was Wynn's employer 
for purposes of workmen's compensation 
coverage. 
[1] Whether an accidental injury arises 
out of or within the scope of employment 
depends upon the particular circumstances 
of each case, Momr v. Industrie/ Commis-
sion, 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P.2d 2B (1968). 
This case, like Moser, is distinguishable 
from the usual case of going to, or coming 
from, work, which is not generally within 
the scope of employment, Wilton v. Indus-
trial Commission, 116 Utah 46, 207 ?2d 
1116 (1949). 
[2] The Commission in the instant case 
found Wynn's practice was to take the trac-
tor to his home, where he cleaned and ser-
viced it to keep it in proper running condi-
tion. It was understood that this mainte-
nance work was Wynn's responsibility, and 
it was done with the knowledge of both 
Kinne and the general manager of Free-
port Wynn kept the required maintenance 
tools at his home. On the weekend preced-
ing the accident, Wynn had taken the trac-
tor home and had performed certain re-
quired repairs on it, for the benefit of 
Kinne and Freeport and in accord with the 
agreement between the two employers. 
The Commission's conclusion that Wynn 
was in the course of his employment at the 
time of the accident is clearly supported by 
substantial evidence. 
[3] Kinne's argument that he was not 
Wynn's employer and therefore had no lia-
bility for workmen's compensation is with-
out merit The question of who is an em-
ployer under a truck lease has been a recur-
ring one before this Court The Commie-
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sion in this case found that the express 
terms of Kinne's lease agreement with 
FVeeport made Kinne the employer of 
Wynn. The agreement gave Kinne the le-
gal right of direction and control over 
Wynn, even though such right may not 
have been exercised. It is the right of 
control that is the critical element underly-
ing an employment relationship in the 
present case. See Utah Fire Clay Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 
183 (1935); Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948). 
Under the terms of the lease agreement, 
Kinne also had the right to hire and fire 
Wynn, he was responsible for paying 
Wynn's wages, and he owned and leased the 
tractor and trailer used by Wynn in the 
performance of his duties. See Harry L 
Young A Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah, 538 
P.2d 316 (1975). These factors support the 
Commission's finding that Kinne was 
Wynn's employer. 
[4,5] The lease agreement provided 
that Kinne would maintain workmen's com-
pensation coverage for his drivers. Such an 
agreement dearly may not be used to avoid 
liability for workmen's compensation bene-
fits by a statutory employer, such as Free-
port was found to be in the present case. 
But Kinne seeks to disclaim his liability for 
compensation benefits in spite of the ex-
press terms of the agreement making him 
responsible for such coverage. It is not 
unreasonable to hold a party responsible for 
obligations he assumes by contract Fur-
thermore, Wynn stood in the position of a 
third-party beneficiary of the contract be-
tween Kinne and Freeport, since the work-
men's compensation provision was for the 
benefit of the drivers hired by Kinne for 
the vehicles he leased to Freeport. Kinne 
may not avoid his liability to Wynn as 
spelled out by the terms of his signed agree-
ment. 
[6] The findings of the Commission are 
supported by the record. It did not err as a 
matter of law in finding an employment 
relationship between Kinne and Wynn and 
joint liability for compensation on the part 
of Kinne Moreover, Kinne is not relieved 
of his obligation by the fact that another 
employer, Freeport Transport, Inc-, was a 
statutory employer also responsible for 
workmen's compensation coverage. An em-
ployee, for the purpose of workmen's com-
pensation, may have two employers. See 
Blessing v. T. Shriver A Co., 94 N J.Super. 
426, 228 A.2d 711 (1967). 
The Commission's order is affirmed. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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Wife moved to set aside a divorce de-
cree on ground of fraud. The Third Dis-
trict Court Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., denied the motion, and wife 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart J.» 
held that trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow wife a hearing on her 
motion to set aside a divorce decree on 
grounds of fraud, since it appeared that the 
assets of parties might actually have been 
more than five times the amount disclosed 
by husband at time of settlement agree-
ment, there was support in record for wife's 
contention that husband prevented wife 
from gaining full and accurate knowledge 
of his total assets, and husband's record of 
noncompliance with discovery procedure 
would not be overlooked solely on ground 
that wife was perhaps guilty of some de-
